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Models of inflation usually have monetary policy impacting the economy through 
either an interest rate or a monetary/credit quantity channel but not through both.   
We argue that policy is transmitted via two distinct types of agents – those that are 
and that are not liquidity constrained.   The implication is that both channels must be 
seen as complementary, joint indicators of inflation and must both be incorporated in 
models of inflation.  We provide a formal representation of price level determination 
and behaviour in this segmented markets framework and evaluate it econometrically 
using US data.     
 
 A SEGMENTED MARKETS MODEL OF INFLATION 
 
1. Introduction 
This paper puts forward a new, segmented markets model of inflation.   It builds on 
two key propositions.   The first is that inflation is the outcome of monetary policy 
actions, while the second is that inflation is transmitted to the economy by the central 
bank via two generically distinct channels.   These two channels reflect the behaviour 
of two distinct types of agents in the economy, namely those that are liquidity 
constrained and those that are not liquidity constrained.  This liquidity constraint 
distinction is the source of the segmented markets.   The two channels describe the 
behaviour of these agents in response to monetary policy actions.    
A monetary policy action has its effects on economic activity, and ultimately on 
inflation, by disturbing the portfolio equilibrium, and hence the expenditure 
behaviour, of the two agents.   The sizes of the resulting disequilibria measure the 
amount of inflationary or deflationary tension in the economy arising from monetary 
policy actions.   When portfolio equilibrium is restored for both sets of agents, the 
inflation generated from the monetary-policy-induced perturbation ceases and price 
stability is re-established.     
In this segmented markets setting, a monetary policy action impacts on the first type 
of agent ￿ denoted the liquidity-constrained agent ￿ through changing the quantity of 
money balances available.   It impacts on the second type of agent ￿ denoted the non-
liquidity-constrained agent ￿ through its effect on the real rate of interest.   In other 
words, monetary policy is transmitted to the rate of inflation through two channels: 
first, through its impact on the fraction of the money stock available to the liquidity-
constrained sector for its purchase of goods and services and, secondly, through its 
effect on the real interest rate, which matters for the intertemporal expenditure 
decisions of the non-liquidity-constrained agents.   The first channel, in effect, is the 
quantity channel through which the central bank affects prices while the second 
channel has an obvious familiarity to the Wicksellian interest rate channel.   We 
estimate the model for the US economy and find it to have strong explanatory power.      2
Our model stands in contrast to the pattern in the literature where monetary policy is 
modelled as being channelled to the economy either through a financial price (i.e., an 
interest rate) or a financial quantity (i.e., a credit or a monetary aggregate), but not 
both at the same time.
1   Models of the first type usually focus on Taylor rules, which 
tend to summarise the stance of monetary policy exclusively in terms of a rate of 
interest.   Models of the second type tend to look at financial quantity variables, of 
which a well-known example is the P-star model.   There is little controversy about 
the interest rate effect in current economic discussion.   It is the key aspect of the 
conventional wisdom about how monetary policy affects the economy.   The 
financial quantity effect, which can be rationalised as stemming from the types of 
mechanisms stressed by monetarists (such as real balance effects) or from bank loan 
market imperfections (more popularly known as the credit channel), is subject to 
more debate.   Yet, in an authoritative review, Kashyap and Stein (1997, p. 5) take 
the view that: ￿Overall the results suggest that monetary policy may have important 
real consequences, but not because of standard interest rate effects￿.    
What is less well established, and the core of the argument here, is that there is no 
choice to be made between the two channels.   Rather, both are simultaneously 
operative and a complete explanation of inflation requires the inclusion of both 
channels.   In our model, an expansionary monetary policy has the following effects.   
It reduces the real rate of interest relative to the equilibrium or natural rate, which 
stimulates the consumption expenditures of those non-liquidity constrained 
households for which the rate of interest is the binding constraint.   And, at the same 
time, the same monetary policy action increases the money stock relative to its ex-
ante demand and stimulates the consumption expenditures of those households for 
which the quantity of money is the binding constraint on expenditures.   In our 
empirical analysis, we use the gap between the market and equilibrium real rate of 
interest, i.e., the real interest rate gap, to capture the first channel, while for the 
second channel we use an excess-money variable, or what we term the money gap.  
In re-establishing their respective equilibrium positions following a monetary policy 
action, both sectors adjust and in doing so generate inflation.   The private sector is 
                                                 
1   For example, recently popular models proposed by, e.g., Woodford (2003) and Neiss and Nelson 
(2003) clearly indicate the ￿real interest rate gap￿ channel as an alternative to indices using financial 
quantity variables such as monetary or credit aggregates.       3
merely propagating, however, the inflationary pressures triggered by the central 
bank.   The proposed model, therefore, suggests that to capture the determinants of 
inflation all one needs to focus on are the determinants of aggregate expenditures that 
are directly and fairly immediately amenable to manipulation by the central bank.     
The immediate interface between the central bank and the non-bank private sector 
following a monetary policy action takes place in the commercial bank loan market.   
Since the central bank is the only source of inflation and since it interacts exclusively 
with banks in monetary policy operations, the first step then to understanding the 
inflation process is to focus on the behaviour of banks themselves in the wake of 
monetary policy actions.   The most immediate repercussion of monetary policy is on 
banks￿ lending behaviour.   And, in this respect, it is of key importance to distinguish 
between two types of borrowers who are assumed to populate the bank loan market, 
that is between agents that are usually, but not necessarily always, liquidity 
constrained and those that are never liquidity constrained.   This is the source of 
market segmentation in our model and the basis for our theoretical and empirical 
modelling.   
Since these two disequilibria arise in the bank loan market, where central banks￿ 
policy actions are first felt, they together convey a more complete measure of 
inflationary tensions, and, accordingly, explain better subsequent actual inflation than 
more conventionally used variables such as the output gap or the deviation of 
unemployment from its natural rate.   The now almost standard model of inflation, 
the New Keynesian Phillips Curve model, focuses on the labour market.   Although 
the labour market seems to play a key role in most models of inflation, regardless of 
which school of thought inspires the model, we believe that developments in that 
market are quite far removed in the transmission process from the actions of the 
central bank.   Pressure points that arise earlier in the transmission process are much 
closer to the ultimate source of inflation, which after all is the central bank itself.   
They should, therefore, provide a much more accurate picture of the long-term 
inflation potential arising in the economy than are provided by other indicators based 
on product or labour markets which reflect aspects of private sector behaviour that 
are (much) less closely related to monetary policy.     4
The paper is organised as follows.   In section 2, a graphical representation, 
emphasising the dichotomy among participants in the loans market, is used to 
motivate our segmented markets model of inflation.   Section 3 provides a formal 
representation of price level determination and behaviour in the segmented markets 
framework.   In section 4, the results of an econometric evaluation of the model, 
using US data, are given.    Section 5 concludes.  
2.  The Segmented Markets Approach and the Impact of Monetary Policy 
  -  Uses of the Segmented Markets Approach 
In arguing that inflation operates through two channels, it is necessary to think of an 
economy in which agents are segmented into two groups with contrasting degrees of 
participation in financial markets.   This kind of distinction has proven very useful in 
empirical applications, most familiarly in examining aggregate consumption and 
investment.   In aggregate consumption research, the two types of agents have been 
described variously as maximising and rule-of-thumb agents (see Campbell and 
Mankiw, 1989, 1991) and non-liquidity constrained and liquidity-constrained agents 
(Zeldes, 1989).   More recently, Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans (1997) have 
popularised a model (the limited participation model) due to Rotemberg (1984).   
This model effectively rationalises liquidity constraints by arguing that individuals 
may be unable to adjust the levels of their cash balances quickly enough to enable 
them to smooth their expenditures over time since they have only limited 
opportunities to participate in financial markets.   In a more recent paper, Alvarez, 
Lucas and Weber (2001) use a two-agent model, which they call a model of 
segmented markets, to generate the elusive liquidity effect of monetary policy and to 
examine other aspects of monetary policy.   The segmented markets conceptual 
framework is, therefore, not just a convenient heuristic device but is also considered 
a sensible description of reality.    
  -  Description of the Two Agents 
Liquidity-constrained agents have inadequate access to financial markets.   This is 
because they cannot, for example, easily mobilise their non-human assets as 
collateral in the loan market or cannot leverage on the basis of their human capital 
(future labour income).  They, therefore, cannot always gain access to liquidity 
needed for consumption purposes.   They are unable to participate fully in financial   5
markets and could be said to experience ￿portfolio stickiness￿.   The binding 
constraint that is relevant to liquidity-constrained agents in undertaking spending and 
that is, at the same time, amenable to control by the central bank is the amount of the 
nominal money stock held by them.   Although they do hold some fraction of the 
money stock, their holdings are not easily adjusted and so these agents are frequently 
constrained relative to their desired expenditure plans.   The binding constraint they 
face then is the amount of liquidity rather than its price.   Consequently, the 
expenditures of liquidity-constrained agents are not affected by the rate of interest.    
The binding constraint for non-liquidity-constrained agents, which can 
simultaneously be manipulated by monetary policy, is the real rate of interest.   
Although these agents also hold a certain proportion of the money stock, their 
holdings do not constitute binding constraints in the sense that they can always 
borrow from banks at the prevailing loan rate.  To have an impact on the 
expenditures of these agents, the central bank has to raise or lower the actual real rate 
of interest, which it can control in the short to medium term, relative to the 
corresponding natural or equilibrium rate, which it cannot control.  These agents are 
only concerned about the price of liquidity and not its quantity, since they can always 
obtain whatever amounts of liquidity they want at the going rate of interest.    
  -  Diagrammatic Illustration of the Impact of Monetary Policy on the Loan  
   Market  
Before providing a formal representation of price level determination in this two-
agent economy in the next section, we provide a graphical analysis of how the two 
channels of monetary policy operate by looking at the market for bank loans.   The 
well-known Stiglitz-Weiss (1989) model of credit rationing can be used to convey an 
intuitive understanding of how monetary policy operates simultaneously via both an 
interest rate and a financial quantity effect.    In this segmented markets framework, 
changes in monetary policy operate through two generic channels, where those 
channels relate to the two types of agents already described.   This is illustrated in the 
flow diagram in Chart 1, which is largely self-explanatory.   L and N refer to 
liquidity￿constrained and non-liquidity-constrained households, respectively.   The 
existence of two channels does not mean that the central bank controls two things at  
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the same time but merely that its operations affect both types of agents differently, 
determined by their contrasting levels of success in raising funds in the bank loan 
market.    
A diagrammatic exposition of the bank loan market is given in Figure 1.   It displays 
two loan supply schedules.   The first (S
CL) is an upward-sloping loan supply 
schedule in which banks increase loan supply for every increase in the loan rate of 
interest ￿ i.e., the classical, full-information configuration.   In other words, there is 
always an interest rate premium, which compensates the bank for supplying loans to 
increasingly risky borrowers.   The market imperfection already alluded to is 
assumed to take the form of asymmetric information in the bank loan market.   It is 
depicted in the figure as the asymmetric-information loan supply schedule (i.e., S
0).   
It shows the supply of loans reaching a maximum at R
MAX (the profit-maximising 
loan rate of interest from the point of view of the bank) and then becoming 
backward-bending.   Beyond point B (corresponding to the loan amount L
MAX and 
the interest rate R
MAX), asymmetric information problems become so acute that the 




Causes money disequilibrium (via 
credit rationing or excess loan 
supply) 
L consumption expenditure 
directly affected by an excess or 
deficiency of money balances
Contraction or expansion of 
consumption relative to fixed 
consumption endowment →  
inflation 
N Households 
Causes the real interest rate to 
deviate from its equilibrium value 
(R*) 
L Households cut back (step up) 
consumption expenditures when   
R > R*(R < R*) 
Contraction or expansion of 
consumption relative to fixed 
consumption endowment →  
inflation   7
Figure 1:  Full Information and Asymmetric Information Loan Supply Schedules 
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backward-bending supply schedule are well known.
2    They derive from traits of 
economic behaviour summarised in the terms moral hazard and adverse selection, 
reflecting the difficulties banks face in dealing with the limited information available 
to them about borrowers.        
Henceforth we only deal with the more realistic backward-sloping loan supply curve. 
Turning to the demand side of the loan market, two demand schedules are shown in 
Figure 2.   The first schedule, D
N, represents the loan demand schedule of the ￿full-
information￿ N sector borrowers.   These borrowers are always given priority by the 
bank.   The demand schedule of the ￿full-information￿ borrowers has to intersect the 
loan offer curve in the upward-sloping AB segment of the curve as N agents are 
operating in a world that can be described by the classical loanable funds theory of 
the rate of interest.      
The second schedule, D
MKT, represents the total market demand schedule for loans, 
comprising the demand schedules of the N and the L sectors (i.e., D
N and D
L, where  
                                                 
2  The loan supply schedule is normally shown as backward bending but this is not necessary to 
demonstrate the credit rationing effect.   It could truncate at the point corresponding to R
MAX.      8
Figure 2:  Loan Supply and Loan Demand Schedules 
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D
L is the demand schedule of asymmetric information borrowers).   It is, 
accordingly, positioned to the right of D
N.   In general, we would expect D
N to 
intersect the supply schedule short of B so that the difference in loan supply (i.e. 
L
MAX ￿ L
N) is available to the bank to distribute among ￿asymmetric information￿ 
borrowers at the maximum loan rate, R
MAX.   Since this amount is less than the 
demand for loans by the L sector (i.e., L
T ￿ L
N) at the rate R
MAX, the available loans 
are rationed among L borrowers.   As banks grant more loans in moving from full-
information to asymmetric information borrowers, their ability to screen accurately is 
reduced because they have to ￿go down the list￿ of borrowing prospects (see Stiglitz 
and Greenwald, 2003).   These borrowers are, depending on the stance of monetary 
policy, liquidity-constrained at least some of the time.       
It is clear that the borrowing and expenditure decisions of ￿asymmetric information￿ 
borrowers are not affected by the loan rate of interest since the rate that they are 
willing to pay for additional funds (R
v in Figure 2) is in excess of the maximum rate 
being sought by the lender (i.e., R
MAX).   For them, there is a pure credit-rationing, or 
quantity, effect.   The L sector of the economy is, therefore, never constrained by the   9
loan rate of interest.  Rather, their effective constraint is the amount of loans 
obtainable by them.   The N sector, on the other hand, is never constrained by a 
nominal quantity variable since for them the effective constraint is the cost of funds 
as they can always obtain whatever funding they want in the bank loan market, 
subject to paying the going rate of interest.   In other words, N￿s consumption does 
not depend on the level of credit or money.     
How does a change in monetary policy impact on the loans market and, specifically, 
on the behaviour of N and L consumers?   Consider a tightening of the stance of 
monetary policy conducted in the traditional manner of the central bank selling 
bonds to their monetary policy counterparts, which are exclusively banks.   This 
implies a reduction in the supply of bank reserves and a corresponding reduction in 
the availability of funds to supply as loans.   It shifts the loan supply schedule to the 
left throughout its full range, i.e., from S
0 to S
1 (see Figure 3).   The tightening of 
monetary policy has two effects.   First, it raises the rate of interest for N sector 
borrowers (from R
0 to R





1).   The lower demand for loans reflects decisions by N sector borrowers to 
defer consumption.   That is, they make a downward revision in their real 
expenditure plans for the current period on account of the higher rate of interest with 
a view to consuming more in the future.   The decline in their demand for loans is 
purely endogenous, reflecting a lower desired level of consumption in the current 
period.   In other words, these consumers still attain their desired consumption levels 
on account of their unlimited access to bank loans but their level of borrowings has 
declined due to the rise in the interest rate (from R
0 to R
1).   The second effect of the 
leftward shift in the loan supply schedule is to increase the level of rationing 






1).  The lower level of 
loans available to L agents forces them to retrench on their consumption 
expenditures.   
Figure 3 then illustrates, to paraphrase Stiglitz and Greenwald (2003, p.38), that with 
credit rationing, monetary policy exerts its effects not only through interest rates, but 
also through credit availability.   This twin effect could be generalised to refer to loan 
market disequilibrium, with the effects of a monetary policy change on the 
consumption spending of L and N agents reinforcing each other.       10
Figure 3:  The Loans Market and a Change in the Stance of Monetary Policy 
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All funds raised in the loan market by L and N agents are assumed to be credited 
instantaneously to the borrower￿s overnight deposit account at the lending bank 
where it is available as immediate liquidity to be used for consumption purposes.   
They are added to whatever money balances the agents will already have 
accumulated.   The provenance of these other money balances is explained in the 
next section of the paper.   This, conveniently, allows us to talk of liquidity 
constraints in terms of money balances despite the fact that the source of the 
constraints is to be found in the bank loan market, as just explained.            
3.  Price Level Determination and Adjustment in a Segmented Loans Market 
Economy 
- Description of the Economy 
Both types of agent, or household, are assumed to receive the same endowment of 
goods, y, each period.   The economy￿s resource constraint is written as:      
Nt Lt c ) 1 ( c y λ − + λ =        ( 1 )    11
The parameters λ  and (1 - λ ) represent the fractions of households (where λ is less 
than or equal to one) that are liquidity constrained (L) and non-liquidity constrained 
(N), respectively, and cLt and cNt their respective real consumption bundles in period 
t.
3    
The N consumers are assumed to have identical preferences as encapsulated in the 
following utility function:    
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Where c is consumption, δ  is the subjective rate of discount, and Et is the 
expectation conditional on information available at time t.   If the representative 
consumer can borrow and lend at the real interest rate, r, then the first-order 
condition necessary for an optimum is:     
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= +    (3) 
This implies that, given the interest rate and the discount rate, each N consumer seeks 
to consume a particular utility-maximising bundle of goods in the current period, 
which we denote as cNt.     
No household consumes its own endowment but rather each trades its own 
endowment so as to acquire funds to purchase goods.   Exchange is governed by a 
cash-in-advance constraint.   This implies that there is a need to hold transactions 
balances in equilibrium.   Each of the L and N households consists of a seller and a 
shopper.   The seller￿s function is to sell the household￿s endowment for cash in the 
goods market and hand over the cash to the household￿s shopper who then buys 
goods in the same market.   As in ALW, the cash-in-advance constraint is modified 
to allow for shocks to velocity, v, which has a value range of greater than zero and 
less than unity.   These arise from the fact that the amount of cash available to the 
shopper from the till of the seller is variable since it is affected by the randomness of  
                                                 
3  Although we use some of the parable and terminology of Alvarez, Lucas and Weber (henceforth 
referred to as ALW) (2001), the model specified here is quite different in a number of respects.  One 
difference in assumption is crucial, which is that in ALW all agents are at times liquidity constrained   12
buyers￿ visits and purchases from a seller￿s shop.   This means that velocity can vary 
from period to period.    
The funds available to shoppers for consumption can come from three sources:  a 
variable fraction of current period sales (i.e., vtPty), unspent receipts from sales in the 
previous period ((i.e., (1￿vt-1)Pt-1y or, equivalently, Mt-1), and from banks following 
monetary policy measures.   With the velocity of money, the goods endowment and 
the price level common to all agents, consumption expenditure will differ between N 
and L agents depending on how they interact with the banking system.   Both types 
of household can supplement their money balances by borrowing from banks.    
N households have unlimited access to bank loans and do not encounter any funding 
difficulties in the sense that they can obtain as much funding as desired provided they 
are willing to pay the going interest rate.   They need funding to bridge the gap 
between the consumption that can be funded from the two sources just noted and that 
required to fund their desired consumption bundle in the current period, cNt.   But 
since this required funding is always forthcoming, it is never a binding constraint on 
their level of consumption.   L households, however, are often rationed in the loan 
market because of unresolved asymmetric information problems.   Although they can 
raise loans from banks, they end up getting less than they need to attain the desired 
consumption bundle.   The implication is that for both types of households, the cash-
in-advance constraint exists, but for N households it does not impose a constraint on 
consumption since they can acquire as much transactions balances (via the loan 
market) as they need to carry out their consumption plans.
4  
In this setting, N agents, who are always capable of accessing the loan market for 
additional funding, are always on their money demand schedules.   L agents, on the 
other hand, are often rationed in the loan market but at other times can experience 
excess money supply.  In contrast to N agents, they are therefore almost never on 
their money demand schedules.          
                                                                                                                                            
while in the model being proposed here only L agents are sometimes liquidity constrained while N 
agents are never liquidity constrained.      
4  L agents in this model differ, therefore, from ￿non-traders￿ in ALW in that they do participate 
indirectly in monetary policy operations via the bank loan market although they may not be successful 
in garnering the desired level of funding.  It would seem to be preferable to have L households 
participating in monetary policy because it is via some kind of financial markets imperfection (e.g., 
the liquidity constraints of the L households) that monetary policy has its effects on the economy.      13
    -  Price Level Determination  
We denote the total amount of bank lending following a monetary policy action by 
M ∆ .   The bar indicates that M is exogenously determined to the private non-
banking sector of the economy by monetary policy action and the portfolio decisions 
of commercial banks.   An M variable without a bar means that it is endogenously 
determined by the relevant sector of the economy.   The differences between the two 
sets of households are modelled by assuming that, following a monetary policy-
driven expansion of the money stock, N households have first call on the change in 
the money stock (taking  N M ∆ of it, which is assumed to be always sufficient to 
satisfy N￿s consumption needs), with the remaining amount, () N M M ∆ − ∆ , being 
rationed among  L households.   
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This says that the level of L households￿ consumption spending in the current period 
is constrained by the amount of money available to them.   This, in turn, is equal to 
the exogenous amount which can be borrowed from banks following any central 
bank monetary policy operation in the current period after the loan demand of N 
agents, who get priority access to bank funding is satisfied, plus the varying amount 
that may become available from the efficiency or productivity of money as reflected 
in velocity (v), which is proportional to current sales [i.e.,  y P v t t in total].      
In contrast, the consumption of N agents is the outcome from the optimising 
framework in equations (2) and (3) above.   We denote it by cN and their nominal   14
expenditures in period t is Pt cNt, or CNt.   The consumption spending of N households 
is, therefore, completely independent of the level of funding.
5    
Multiplying equation (1) by Pt, and substituting in for the nominal expenditures of L 
and N households, we obtain the following:     
()
() () Nt t t Nt t
Nt Lt t t
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=      (5) 
Equation (5) indicates the determination of the price level in this segmented markets 
model.  In this representation, the price level is determined at any point in time, 
firstly, by that part of the money stock held by L households,  L M , which is 
exogenously determined by the monetary policy actions of the central bank and the 
loan supply behaviour of commercial banks in an asymmetric information setting, 
and, secondly, by the (realised) consumption plans of N households which, according 
to the optimising framework in equations (2) and (3), is only a function of the real 
rate of interest (i.e., r) as shown in equation (5).
6   
Equation (5) can be described as a modified quantity theory equation.   In taking 
account of the difference between L and N households, it says that the strict version 
of the quantity theory only holds when λ  = 1, i.e., in a financially repressed and/or 
                                                 
5  In ALW, the consumption of traders depends on the change in the money supply that occurs in open 
market operations.   Our specification differs from ALW in that the consumption of N agents does not 
in any way depend on funding availability.  N agents￿ consumption spending is the outcome of the 
unconstrained optimising framework in equations (2) and (3) in the text.      
6  For convenience, it is only written explicitly as a function of r in the last equation.   15
highly regulated financial system where liquidity constraints are pervasive.
7   When λ 
is less than one, only that part of the money stock held by L agents impacts on the 
price level.   N agents are able to adjust their money balances passively and smoothly 
to whatever level is needed to fund their desired level of expenditure.   It is monetary 
policy￿s effect on the real interest rate that allows it impact N￿s optimal level of 
consumption spending relative to the fixed consumption endowment and, in turn, 
impacts the price level.    
  -  Price Level Disequilibrium  
Equation (5) indicates the determination of the price level at any given time.   It is 
not necessarily, however, a price level consistent with long-run equilibrium.   For L 
consumers, their money holding,  Lt M , may exceed or fall short of their demand for 
money.   For N consumers, the real interest rate, r, may deviate from its long run 
equilibrium value.   Price stability (denoted here by P*) only occurs in the (possibly 
rare) event when both agents are in portfolio equilibrium simultaneously.   This 
happens when L households have their demand for money fulfilled exactly and N 
households are not subject to any incentive to adjust their consumption levels arising 
from a gap between the actual and equilibrium real rates of interest.   The equilibrium 
version of equation (5) is written as follows:     


























=      (6) 
Price stability occurs when L households have their demand for money satisfied 
exactly (i.e.,  Lt Lt M M = ) and the actual real interest rate is equal to its natural or 
equilibrium level (i.e., r = r
*), obviating any incentive for either L or N households to 
alter their level of consumption.    
Subtracting equation (6) from (5) then gives the following:  


























= −  (7) 
                                                 
7  If the segmentation assumption is dropped and all agents are assumed to be liquidity-constrained 
(i.e., λ  set equal to 1) in equation (5) we get the standard quantity theory equation identical to ALW￿s 
equation (4).      16
Equation (7) indicates that deviations of the price level, P, from its equilibrium value, 
P*, are owing to actual money balances deviating from desired levels and the real 
interest rate differing to the equilibrium rate.   These deviations occur as a result of 
monetary policy actions upsetting the portfolio equilibrium of both L and N 
households at the same time.  They leave L agents with either a deficiency of money 
balances (forcing them to cut consumption expenditure) or a surplus (encouraging 
them to spend more than they had planned), while N agents face a real rate of interest 
which is either in excess of the equilibrium rate (thereby causing a retrenchment in 
consumption) or falls short of it (inducing N agents to increase consumption 
spending).  As portfolio equilibrium is restored, consumption spending is driven 
above or below the fixed endowment driving the price level above or below P*.  As 
can be seen from equation (7), only when portfolio equilibrium is fully restored (i.e., 
Lt Lt M M = and rt = rt*) is price stability re-established (i.e., Pt = Pt*).  
  -  Price Level Adjustment  
The price disequilibrium embodied in equation (7) is resolved through the price level 
adjusting to the equilibrium level.   The inflation (deflation) of the price level 
required to resolve the disequilibrium, in turn, must be generated by the nominal 
money gap and real interest rate gap on the right-hand-side of (7).   The implication 
for empirical work is that inflation can be modelled as a function of these two gaps. 
We note that the money gap can be expressed as follows: since, 




Nt Lt t Lt Lt
M M
M M M M M
− =
+ − = −
       ( 8 )  
This, intuitively and conveniently, allows L household money disequilibrium to be 
replaced by economy-wide money disequilibrium since the N households are always 
in equilibrium with respect to money holdings.     17
We invoke the mean-value theorem to rewrite part of the second term on the right 
hand side of equation (7), as follows:
8 
*) r r )( ( C *) r ( C ) r ( C
’
Nt Nt Nt − ρ = −       ( 9 )  
We assume that adjustment of the price level to its equilibrium value in the next 
period takes place, at a fraction, θ, of the current period discrepancy.    
Accordingly, inflation in period t+1, can be expressed as:    
() () ()
()() * r r
y v 1
) ( C 1
M M
y v 1


























− θ = − = ∆ + +
   (10) 
 
4.  An Empirical Assessment of the Segmented Markets Model   
  -  Measures of Inflation and Two Gap Variables  
We use US data, covering the period 1961q2 to 2005q1, to test the segmented 
markets model of inflation embodied in equation (10).   The measure of inflation 
used is the quarter-to-quarter change in the natural log of CPI, which we denote by 
the familiar notation, π, while the aforementioned two gap variables are the 
explanatory variables.
9    
Given equation (10), the appropriate two gap variables are, respectively, a nominal 
money gap and a real interest rate gap.   The nominal money gap, which we denote 
as MGAP, is the residual term from a money demand equation, of the following 
form: 
Mt = α0 + α1Pt  + α1Yt              ( 1 1 )  
                                                 
8  The mean-value theorem (see Chiang, 1984) states that the difference between the value of a 
function ϕ  evaluated at x0 and at any other x value can be expressed as the product of the difference (x 
￿ x0) and the first derivative, ϕ ￿, of the function evaluated at some point, ρ, between points x and xo, 
i.e., ϕ (x) - ϕ (xo) = ϕ ￿(ρ)(x-xo).   Proceeding analogously here gives us the right-hand-side of equation 
(9) in the text.     
9  The data used in the paper are described in Appendix 1.      18
where M is the nominal money stock (M2), P is the price level (CPI) and Y is real 
GDP, with these variables also measured in natural logs.   This money demand 
specification captures a pure transactions demand for money in the spirit of cash-in-
advance with money demand specified, therefore, as a function of a constant and 
nominal income.   The residual term represents the deviation of money balances in 
the economy from that demanded.   Given that all N households are always on their 
money demand schedules, it is exclusively the L sector of the economy that 
experiences an excess or deficiency of real balances.   Accordingly, MGAP provides 
the appropriate measure of the extent of portfolio (or monetary) disequilibrium 
facing the L sector.   It provides our indicator of the inflationary pressures emanating 
from the liquidity-constrained sector of the economy.   MGAP then is the residual 
from the full-sample OLS regression of (11) above: 
Mt = -3.59 + 0.895 Pt + 0.819 Yt             
The real interest rate gap, rt ￿ rt*, captures the other channel of inflationary pressures 
that originate in monetary policy and which are transmitted via the actions of the 
non-liquidity-constrained sector of the economy.   The actual real interest rate is the 
only variable which the central bank can affect which is simultaneously a binding 
constraint on the consumption expenditures of the N sector.   A fall in the actual real 
interest rate brought about by monetary policy drives a wedge between the actual real 
rate and the equilibrium real rate, which is assumed to remain unaffected by 
monetary policy.   This stimulates expenditures by N sector agents but, given the 
fixed endowment of goods and services, this can only result in a pick-up in inflation.    
To estimate the equilibrium real interest rate, we use the consumption-based capital 
asset pricing model (CCAPM).  We invoke equations (2) and (3) above.  Since N 
households are assumed to be able to borrow (and lend) without restriction at the real 
interest rate, r, the first-order condition for optimum consumption is given by 
equation (3).   A generalised Fisher equation is derived from the CCAPM.   An 
estimate of the equilibrium real interest rate facing N households is embedded within 
this equation.   There are three steps involved in the derivation of the equilibrium real 
interest rate.   First, an equilibrium condition between the nominal and real rates of 
interest is derived.   Secondly, an expression for the equilibrium real rate is obtained 
from the condition that the one-period real rate of interest must equal the ex-ante   19
marginal rate of substitution between the consumption of N households now and in 
the next period.   In the third step, this expression for the equilibrium real rate is 
substituted back into the equilibrium condition derived in the first step above to 
obtain, after some algebra, the following generalised Fisher equation:  
() δ + ∆ γ − ∆ γ = + + 1 t t
2
1 t t t c Var
2
1
c E i     
                 () ( ) 1 t 1 t 1 t t 1 t t 1 t t M p , c Cov p Var
2
1
p E + + + + + ∆ + ∆ ∆ γ − ∆ − ∆ +    (12) 
This is an equation relating the nominal rate of interest to a number of terms.
10   The 
equilibrium real rate of interest comprises the first three terms in equation (12), 
namely the sum of the discount rate (δ ), the coefficient of relative risk aversion (γ ) 
times expected consumption of N households (E(∆ c)), less one-half times the product 
of the square of the coefficient of relative risk aversion times the variance of 
expected consumption of N households (Var(∆ c)).      
Note that in equation (12) the N subscript on c has been dropped.   Since the 
consumption expenditures of N households are not observed in the data, we are 
constrained to use total household consumption expenditures, c, in place of cN in the 
empirical implementation of the model.   This does not pose a problem.   This is 
because the model￿s parameter estimates in equation (12) will only reflect the 
behaviour of N households since the consumption expenditures of L households do 
not impact on the rate of interest.   In other words, under the hypothesis that the 
consumption expenditures of L households have no impact on the loan rate of 
interest (refer back to Figure 2), the effect of the consumption of N households on 
the interest rate will be the same as that of total consumption on the interest rate.   As 
shown in Figure 2, the borrowing and expenditure decisions of L households are not 
affected by the loan rate of interest because the rate they would be willing to pay is 
well in excess of the cap the banks place on the actual rate.   It is also clear from this 
diagram that the variation in the consumption expenditures of L households do not 
impact on the rate of interest.
11   
                                                 
10 The detailed derivation of equation (12) and explanation of all terms is presented in Appendix 2.    
11 Or do so only very slightly in the L
MAX ￿ L
N range.     20
The method for estimating equation (12) is described in Appendix 2, with the sum of 
the first three terms above giving us an estimate of the equilibrium real interest rate.   
The difference between this and the actual real rate (i.e., the nominal rate minus the 
expected inflation rate) is then our estimate of the real interest rate gap.       
  -  Unit Root Properties of Inflation and Two Gap Variables 
We first consider the unit root properties of the three variables, π, MGAP and r ￿ r*, 
used in the empirics.   We use Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) and the non-
parametric Phillips-Perron (PP) statistics to test the order of integration of the level 
and first-difference of each variable.   The lags for the ADF statistics are selected 
using the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) and the Schwartz Bayesian Criterion 
(SBC).   For the PP statistic, we follow Greene (2003, p.267) in using the smallest 
integer greater than or equal to the sample size to the power of … in choosing the 
truncation point for the Newey-West adjustment required for calculating the PP 
statistic.    
Table 1: Augmented Dickey-Fuller and Phillips-Perron Statistics, 1961q2-
2005q1   
  π  MGAP  r - r* 
LEVELS     
ADF (AIC)  -2.45 -2.47 -2.64 
ADF (SBC)  -2.45 -2.03 -2.38 
Phillips-Perron  -3.46 -1.47 -2.40 
Critical 95 per cent value  -2.88 -2.88  -2.88 
FIRST DIFFERENCE     
ADF (AIC)  -15.64 -5.38  -5.35 
ADF (SBC)  -15.64 -9.65  -12.06 
Phillips-Perron  -22.56 -8.35  -11.58 
Critical 95 per cent value  -2.88  -2.88  -2.88 
 
The statistics, reported in Table 1, are unequivocal in indicating each of the two gap 
variables to be integrated of order one.   The evidence is more mixed for the rate of 
inflation, π, with both ADF statistics indicating a unit root process, while the PP 
statistic points to a stationary series.  We found that the autocorrelation function for 
the rate of inflation was significant up to seven lags and a plot of the autocorrelation 
function dies away quite slowly, an indicator of a non-stationary process, while the   21
autocorrelation of the first difference of the inflation rate falls away to zero rapidly.
12   
This can be taken as indicating that the inflation process is an I(1) process.   We, 
therefore, choose to take the inflation rate to be a unit root process, a conclusion that 
has been drawn previously (for example, by Hallman, Porter, and Small, 1991).   We 
do not see anything awry in the inflation rate and two gap measures, which are all 
dependent on the practice of monetary policy over time, not being mean-reverting in 
practice.      
  -  Cointegration Analysis 
With the three variables, π, MGAP and r ￿ r*, each integrated of order one, the 
Johansen procedure provides an appropriate estimation method to discern whether 
there is a long run cointegrating relationship between these variables and whether the 
signs on the two gap variables are consistent with our theoretical expectation.   It also 
provides a basis for examining the short-run dynamic movements of π. 
We first run unrestricted VARs up to lag 24, adding a constant and time trend term to 
the three variables, in order to select the appropriate lag for the cointegrating VAR 
estimations.   The SBC favours a second-lag ordering but the underlying equations at 
this lag have serially correlated error terms and so this lag length is discounted.   The 
AIC selects lag 18 and in this case all three equations have serially uncorrelated 
terms.   This is also the first lag length suggested suitable by a Likelihood Ratio test.   
In contrast to the lag ordering suggested by the SBC, this longer lag length also 
gives, as we shall see, economically sensible results.   We are unsurprised at a longer 
lag length giving better results as we would expect both gap terms to be subject to 
long and variable lags in transmitting to inflation, given our earlier discussion of how 
the gap variables will be chronologically close to monetary policy actions and 
therefore at some remove from the ultimate outturn of those actions, i.e. 
inflation/deflation.     
A VAR ordering of eighteen is then chosen.   The time trend is insignificant in the 
unrestricted VARs and, accordingly, we estimate the cointegrating VARs with a 
restricted intercept but no trend in the cointegrating VARs.   In the econometric 
estimations, we stipulate the two gap variables as the exogenous or long-run forcing 
                                                 
12  A similar exercise for MGAP and (r-r*) yielded similar findings for those two variables.   22
variables and π as the endogenous variable.   The trace and maximum eigenvalue 
statistic are identical in this case and reject the null hypothesis of no cointegrating 
relation among the three variables in favour of one cointegrating relationship, as we 
would expect, with the reported statistic of 25.97 being well above the 95 percent 
critical value of 15.27.    
We normalise this cointegrating VAR on π and find the estimated coefficients, with 
t-statistics in brackets, on the two gap variables to be significant and of the expected 
sign: 
π t =  0.0098  +  0.0678 MGAPt   ￿  0.0025 rt-rt* 
        (16.72)      (5.30)                      (5.21)                      
The nominal money gap has a positive value, indicating that when nominal money 
balances exceed the amount consistent with real demand for them, inflation will rise 
to remove this discrepancy.   The sign on the real interest rate gap is negative: when 
the actual real rate is less than the natural rate, inflation will increase.      
  - Short-Run Dynamic Analysis 
With favourable cointegration results, we proceed to examining the short-run 
dynamics of inflation.   The first-difference of π, ∆π, is the dependent variable and is 
regressed on seventeen lags of itself, seventeen lags of the first difference of each of 
the two gap variables, and the error term, ECM, from the cointegrating VAR, lagged 
one quarter.   This error correction term is the difference between actual inflation and 
fitted inflation.   The latter, of course, depends on the two gap variables and is, 
accordingly, the measure of monetary policy-driven or, for shorthand, ￿monetary￿ 
inflation.   For space considerations, we report only the estimate of the coefficient on 
the ECM term in Table 2, along with relevant diagnostic results for the regression 
equation.    
The results are very satisfactory: the error correction term (the difference between 
actual and fitted/￿monetary￿ inflation) has the correct sign and the speed-of-
adjustment coefficient has an absolute value of 0.52, indicating a fast correction of 
actual inflation to its long run, monetary determinant.   Diagnostic tests reveal the 
error terms to be serially uncorrelated and not to display ARCH.   Some non-
normality, however, is present but this should not be unexpected when dealing with   23
the rate of change in inflation.   CUSUM and CUSUMQ tests, not shown, are also 
comfortably passed and the RESET statistic is supportive of the functional form 
specification.   Finally, the regression equation has an R-square value of 0.70. 
Table 2:  Short-Run Dynamic Equation Results for Inflation, 1966q1 – 2005q1  
∆π t = ￿ -0.52 ECM t-1 
               (4.34)   
(t-statistics in brackets) 
R
2 = 0.70;    
LM test for serial correlation (χ
2, 4 DF) = 5.59; 
Bera-Jarque normality test (χ
2, 2 DF) = 15.66 
RESET test for functional form (χ
2, 1 DF) = 1.19 
ARCH test (χ
2, 4 DF) = 2.78 
 
- Other Econometric Analysis 
We conclude our empirical analysis with two exercises.   First of all, the robustness 
of the cointegration and short-run dynamic equation results is checked by 
reestimating for a shorter sample period, from 1961q2 to 2000q1.   The results do not 
differ qualitatively from our baseline, full-sample results.   Secondly, we examine 
whether π is cointegrated with each individual gap variable on its own.   The 
maximum eigenvalue/trace statistic indicate the absence of any cointegrating 
relationship in either case ￿ results that point to the need for both gap variables to be 
used together in explaining inflation. 
5. Conclusion 
In this paper, we have proposed a theory of inflation based on the distinction between 
two types of agent, or household, who populate the non-financial sector of the 
economy.   The distinction is based on the idea that households fall into one or other 
of two categories.   They are either liquidity constrained or not liquidity constrained.   
This implies that monetary policy is transmitted to the economy and impacts on the 
price level exclusively via two generically different channels, which correspond to the 
distinct behaviour of these two types of households.      24
Our model provides a richer representation of price level determination than standard 
Quantity Theory or Wicksellian explanations.   It shows the price level being 
determined by the actions of both types of household and, accordingly, monetary 
policy affecting the price level through two channels, i.e., via the money stock 
available to liquidity-constrained households and via the real interest rate which 
matters to the intertemporal allocation of consumption expenditures by non-liquidity 
constrained households.   The first channel is similar to the monetarist explanation of 
the process of inflation while the second is in line with Wicksellian descriptions.   
Yet, because each channel relates only to one of the two sectors, neither on its own 
gives a complete account of the inflation process.    
A key implication of the model then is that there is no choice to be made between 
modelling inflation as being channelled either through a financial price (i.e., an 
interest rate) or a financial quantity (i.e., a credit or monetary aggregate) as both 
channels operate simultaneously.   This is because any monetary policy action 
impacts on the two types of households differently arising from their contrasting 
experiences in the bank loans market.   Two tension variables are derived which 
capture the portfolio disequilibria of the two types of households following a change 
in the monetary policy stance.   The expenditure patterns of the two sets of 
households are affected in different ways as they endeavour to re-attain their 
respective portfolio equilibrium positions.   In the assumed fixed-endowment 
economy, these actions generate inflation or deflation depending on the direction of 
the monetary policy action driving the process.        
Accordingly, we believe that a complete picture of the inflation generated by the 
central bank requires that both channels be accounted for.   On the empirical front, it 
means that the two channels of transmission corresponding to the Wicksellian real 
interest rate gap (i.e., the difference between the actual and equilibrium real interest 
rates affecting the consumption patterns of non-liquidity constrained agents) and the 
quantity-theoretic money gap (i.e., the difference between the demand for money 
balances and the stock of money balances outstanding affecting the consumption of 
liquidity-constrained agents) are joint indicators of inflationary pressures arising from 
monetary policy actions.   Empirically, the segmented markets model then indicates 
that the nominal money gap and the real interest rate gap are joint indicators of   25
inflationary pressures arising from monetary policy actions and that neither on its 
own is a sufficient indicator.   This is supported by our econometric results for the 
US.   26
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Appendix 1:  Data Description 
 
Consumer Price Index for All Urban Consumers: All Items,   
1982-84=100, Seasonally Adjusted.  
Source: U.S. Department of Labor: Bureau of Labor Statistics.  
M2 Money Stock, 
Billions of Dollars, Seasonally Adjusted. 
Source:  Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System. 
Real Gross Domestic Product, 
Billions of Chained 2000 Dollars, Seasonally Adjusted Annual Rate. 
Source:  U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis. 
3-Month Treasury Bill: Secondary Market Rate,  
Non-Adjusted. 
Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System. 
Real Personal Consumption Expenditure, 
Billions of Chained 2000 Dollars, Seasonally Adjusted Annual Rate. 
Source:  U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis. 
Consumer Price Index for All Urban Consumers: All Items less Energy,   
1982-84=100, Seasonally Adjusted.  
Source:  U.S. Department of Labor: Bureau of Labor Statistics.  
Total Reserves, Adjusted for Changes in Reserve Requirements, 
Billions of Dollars, Seasonally Adjusted.  
Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System. 
 
    28
Appendix 2: Estimation of Equilibrium Real Interest Rate 
 
Assume a single consumption good and that utility is isoelastic and time separable. 
An individual representative N-household consumer maximises expected utility over 
an infinite horizon: 













E  0  <  Φ < 1, γ  >  0     (i) 
where t E represents expectations conditional on information available in period t , 
Φ is the discount factor, and γ is the coefficient of relative risk aversion.
13 
Equilibrium asset returns are established from the first-order condition of the 
representative consumer￿s maximisation problem.   The first-order condition is:  
      ] Q / Q C [ E C 1 t 1 t 1 t t t + +
γ −
+
γ − Φ =        ( i i )  
where t Q is the value of an asset stated in terms of consumption goods in period t . 
If it is assumed that the asset is a nominal bond, with a nominal interest rate of  t I , 
then the ex-post real return, Rt, on investing in nominal bonds between periods t  and 
1 t +  is:  
      () t 1 t 1 t t t Q / Q P / P I 1 + + = +  
where t P is the nominal price of a good at time t and where 
    t 1 t t Q / Q R 1 + = +   
Therefore, 
   () t 1 t t t R 1 P / P I 1 + = + +   
Optimal portfolio choice requires expected yields on nominal and real bonds of 
identical maturity be equivalent when considered in terms of expected utility.  
                                                 
13 Unlike the main text of the paper, where upper-case is used to denote nominal variables and lower-
case to refer to real variables, in this annex upper-case denotes a non-log variable and lower-case is 
used for log variables.    29
Adding expectations and the marginal utility of consumption in  1 t + establishes the 
equilibrium condition for an individual consumer: 
() ( ) ( ) [] () ( ) [] t 1 t t 1 t t t 1 t t R 1 C ’ U E P / P I 1 C ’ U E + = + + + +  
where 1 t t P / P + is the change in purchasing power of money over one period, 
and () t C ’ U  the marginal utility of consumption in period t .  
The first-order condition for nominal bonds is: 
       () [ ] 1 t t t 1 t t t P / P I 1 C E C +
γ −
+
γ − + Φ =        (iii) 
Applying log normality allows equation (iii) to be rewritten as the equilibrium asset-
pricing condition: 
       () ( ) 1 t 1 t t 1 t t 1 t t t t p , c Cov p Var
2
1
p E r i + + + + ∆ ∆ γ − ∆ − ∆ + =     ( i v )  
A separate expression for the equilibrium real rate of interest, i.e.,  t r  in expression 
(iv),  is obtained from the condition that the one-period real rate must equal the ex-
ante marginal rate of substitution between consumption now and consumption in the 
next period.   This can be derived by considering the return on a real bond.   If the 
known real rate of interest at time t  is  t R , then the purchase of a real bond in period 
t  for  t Q  consumption goods entitles the holder to  1 t t t Q ) R 1 ( Q + = +  goods in  1 t + .    
The first-order condition for a real bond is found by substituting this relationship into 
equation (ii): 
       () [ ] t 1 t t t R 1 C E C + Φ =
γ −
+
γ −           ( v )  
Equation (v) is the equilibrium relationship between the real rate of interest and the 
ex-ante intertemporal marginal rate of substitution.   Applying the assumption of log 
normality and rearranging defines the log of the real rate: 
       () φ − ∆ γ − ∆ γ = + + 1 t t
2
1 t t t c Var
2
1
c E r       ( v i )    30
where  Φ = φ log .   If the future is heavily discounted (i.e., a high value of discount 
factor, Φ ), current consumption is greater and savings are lower.  
We are now in a position to derive a relationship between the nominal interest rate 
and its proximate determinants.   By substituting equation (vi) into (iv) and adding 
∆m to capture a liquidity effect on the nominal rate of interest, as first modelled by 
Fuerst (1992), we can derive the following generalised Fisher equation:    
() () ( ) 1 t 1 t 1 t t 1 t t 1 t t 1 t t
2
1 t t t m p , c Cov p Var
2
1
p E c Var
2
1
c E i + + + + + + + ∆ + ∆ ∆ γ − ∆ − ∆ + δ + ∆ γ − ∆ γ =
 
Note that the discount rate (δ ) is minus the log of the discount factor (Φ ), i.e., δ  = -
lnΦ  and  1 t m + ∆  represents a liquidity effect.
14   An OLS estimation of this final 
equation rendered values of 1.5 for δ  and 0.16 for  γ.
15   These were then used to 
generate the equilibrium real interest rate estimate.     
 
 
                                                 
14 We proxy the liquidity effect, ∆m, by the change in total bank reserves (monetary base less notes 
and coin). 
15 The basic data for i, c, p and m used in this estimation are, respectively, the last four variables 
described in Appendix 1. 